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JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 21, NO. 1
Blocking Eco-Patent Trolls: Using Federalism to Foster Innovation In
Environmental Technology
Forrester Environmental Services, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
“Patent trolls,”1 also known as non-practicing entities (“NPEs”), is a
term used to denote any entity that asserts patent rights based on a patent it
owns but does not practice.2 Over the past decade, the rise of patent trolls has
significantly impacted the patent ecosystem. NPE-related litigation has
become a significant percentage of all patent lawsuits filed.3 The number and
costs of NPE patent assertions are also increasing, 4 and their targets are

1

The term “patent troll“ was coined in 2001 by the Assistant General Counsel for Intel,
Peter Detkin, when he was defending Intel in infringement suits that were necessitated by
these patent trolls. M. Qaiser & P. Mohan Chandran, Patent Terrorism--Terror of the
Intangibles, ENTERPRISE IP (June 27, 2006), http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/
article.asp?id=11605&deptid=3. See Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual
Property Rights by Corporations and Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 105 (2012)
(noting “patent trolls“ are sometimes termed “patent extortionists,“ “patent sharks,“ “patent
terrorists,“ “patent pirates,“ or basically, the word “patent“ combined with any pejorative
noun.). But see Terrence P. McMahon, Stephen J. Akerley, Jane H. Bu, Who Is A Troll? Not
A Simple Answer, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 159 (2006) (discussing the history and development of
the term, as well as the difficulty of defining “patent trolls“); Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents
Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 961, 1023 (2005) (“[A]ny
effort to design a suitable definition of the term ‘troll’ is likely to lend credence to the view
that the status as a troll is in the eye of the beholder.“). See gen. Todd Klein, Ebay v.
Mercexchange and Ksr Int‘l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.: The Supreme Court Wages War Against
Patent Trolls, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 295, 314 (2007).
2
Joel B. Cartera, Responding to a Patent Troll’s Threats, 48 ARK. LAW. 30 (Summer
2013).
3
See James E. Bessen and Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. ___ (Forthcoming 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2091210. In 2011,
2,150 unique companies were forced to mount 5,842 defenses in lawsuits initiated by the
actions of NPEs, as compared to 2005, in which the number of defenses was 1,401. Id.
4
Id. (estimating that the direct costs of NPE patent assertions totaled about $29 billion
in 2011, up from $7 billion in 2005).
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expanding in scope.5 In response, both the United States Supreme Court and
the Federal Circuit have taken steps to control NPE-related litigation in a
series of decisions.6 The Forrester decision represents the Federal Circuit’s
latest attempt to reduce NPEs’ negative effects on the judiciary, and to open
the door for state regulation of patent trolls.
II. FACTS & HOLDING
In Forrester Environmental Services, Inc. v. Wheelabrator
Technologies, Inc.,7 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
addressed whether a past statement made outside the U.S.A. regarding a U.S.
patent and limiting the conduct at issue to Taiwan, creates patent law issues
which are “substantial in the relevant sense” to the case, thus creating subject
matter jurisdiction for federal court jurisdiction.
Forrester Environmental Services, Inc. and Keith E. Forrester
(collectively “Forrester”) and Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc.
(“Wheelabrator”) are competitors in the market for phosphate-based
treatment systems for stabilizing heavy metals in municipal and industrial
waste.8 These treatments prevent heavy metals from potentially leaching into
sources of drinking water.9 Wheelabrator calls its treatment system “WES-

5

Id. Bessen and Meurer’s data shows that small and medium-sized entities made up
90% of the companies sued, accounted for 59% of the defenses, and paid about 37% of the
aggregate costs in 2011. Id. (“Very many of these troll lawsuits are targeted against relatively
small firms…We expected that most [of the lawsuits] would be against the big, highly
recognized brands like Google, Cisco, IBM, Microsoft. It turns out that the majority of the
targets are not such big firms.”).
6
Peter S. Menell et al., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE, §1.1.2.2 (2d ed.
2012); Todd Klein, Ebay v. Mercexchange and Ksr Int‘l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.: The Supreme
Court Wages War Against Patent Trolls, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 295, 314 (2007).
7
715 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
8
Id. at 1331.
9
Id.
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PHix®” and Forrester calls its system “FESI-BOND.”10 Each owns U.S.
patents on their respective waste treatment systems.11
Wheelabrator and Kobin had a mutual Taiwanese customer, Kobin
Environmental Enterprise Co., Ltd. (“Kobin”).12 In 2001, Wheelabrator
entered into a license agreement with a Taiwanese company called Bio Max
Environmental Engineering (“Bio Max”).13 Bio Max then sublicensed WESPHix® to Kobin.14 In 2004, Forrester learned that Kobin was dissatisfied
with the odor generated by the WES-PHix® system.15 In response, Forrester
developed a variation on its FESI-BOND system to address the odor problem
and persuaded Kobin to license FESI-BOND for use at Kobin’s Taipei
plant.16 In 2006, Wheelabrator sent Kobin a letter asserting that Kobin was
in breach of its WES-PHix® sublicense agreement for failure to pay
royalties.17 After the letter, Kobin stopped purchasing from Forrester and
entered into a new WES-PHix® sublicense with Wheelabrator, which license
defined WES-PHix® as “the patented ... and proprietary process of
immobilization of metals, such as lead and cadmium, in solid residues ...
using any solid, liquid or chemical form of phosphate and/or lime,”18

10

Id.
The Federal Circuit noted that Wheelabrator has obtained several related U.S. patents,
including U.S. Patent Nos. 4,737,356 (“the ′356 patent”), 5,430,233 (“the ′233 patent“), and
5,245,114 (“the ′114 patent”). Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. The letter stated that “Wheelabrator understands that Kobin is using a phosphatebased process to treat municipal waste combustion ash ... at Kobin‘s [a]sh processing facility
in Taiwan“ and that “[t]he Sublicense Agreement obligates Kobin to pay Bio Max or
Wheelabrator ... for each tonne [sic] of [a]sh stabilized by phosphate at its [a]sh processing
facility.“ Id. The letter also threatened legal action in Taiwan to enforce the sublicense
agreement. Id.
18
Id. at 1332.
11
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specifically referenced certain patents owned by Wheelabrator,19 and granted
a license to utilize WES-PHix® under said patents in Taiwan.20
In 2010, Forrester filed suit against Wheelabrator in New Hampshire
state court, asserting four state law causes of action as a result of
Wheelabrator’s actions regarding Kobin: violation of the New Hampshire
Consumer Protection Act; tortious interference with a contractual
relationship; tortious interference with Forrester’s prospective advantage; and
trade secret misappropriation.21 Forrester alleged that Wheelabrator made
false representations to Kobin about the scope of Wheelabrator’s patents,
which led Kobin to believe Wheelabrator’s patents covered Forrester’s
system, and caused Kobin to terminate its relationship with Forrester.22
Wheelabrator removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Hampshire.23 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may
remove to federal district court “any civil action brought in a State court of
which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.”24
Forrester moved to remand the case to state court,25 arguing that the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1338, which gives
federal district courts original jurisdiction over “any civil action arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents.”26 Wheelabrator argued that the
court had federal jurisdiction under Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating
Corporation., 486 U.S. 800 (1988), because Forrester could only recover if it
prevailed on a substantial question of U.S. patent law.27 The district court
denied Forrester’s motion, and accepted jurisdiction.28 Proceeding with the
19

U.S. Patents 4,737,356, 5,245,114, and 5,430,233.
Id. at 1332. The agreement did not explain how U.S. patents could be licensed for
activities in Taiwan. Id.
21
Id.
22
Forrester Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 715 F.3d 1329, 1332
(Fed. Cir. 2013).
23
Id.
24
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
25
Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1332.
26
28 U.S.C § 1338.
27
Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1332.
28
Id.
20
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case, the district court granted summary judgment for Wheelabrator.29
Forrester appealed.30
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, agreed
with Forrester, holding removal was improper because the district court
lacked original subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338.31 The
Federal Circuit reasoned that for a state law cause of action to qualify for
jurisdiction under § 1338, it must “involve a patent law issue that is ‘(1)
necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of
resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance
approved by Congress.’”32 The court held that the case did not raise a
“substantial” issue of patent law because there was no prospect of future
conflict between the parties and thus no prospect of inconsistent judgments
between state and federal courts.33 Specifically, no prospect of future
conflict existed because the process was being used in Taiwan and could not
violate United States patents, and because the patents were expired.34 Thus,
any potential conflict was purely “hypothetical.”35 Therefore, the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Forrester’s claims, and the
Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded to the
district court with instructions to remand the case to New Hampshire state
court.36 This holding makes it clear that when the conduct was purely in the
past and does not raise a “substantial” question of federal patent law, federal
patent jurisdiction does not arise in a state-law claim premised on a question
of patent law. 37
29

Id.
Id.
31
28 U.S.C. § 1338.
32
Id.; Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065
(2013)).
33
Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1334.
34
Id. at 1334-1335.
35
Id. at 1335.
36
Forrester Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 715 F.3d 1329, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2013).
37
Id. (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013));
30
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Constitution gives Congress the power to grant intellectual
property rights through patents, in order “[t]o promote the [p]rogress of
[s]cience and useful [a]rts . . . .”38 A patent is an exclusive property right that
is generally granted for a period of 20 years.39 The purpose of the patent
system is to promote innovation and disclosure of inventions while protecting
the research investment of the individual or company.40
FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS INVOLVING PATENTS
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove to a federal
district court “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.”41 Unlike state courts,
a federal court’s jurisdiction is limited to that which Congress grants.42
Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction where diversity or a federal
question exists.43 The general federal question jurisdictional statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1331, grants federal district courts original jurisdiction over all civil
actions “arising under” the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.44 Separate provisions grant the district courts exclusive original
jurisdiction, and the Federal Circuit exclusive appellate jurisdiction, over
38

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2005); U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, General Information
Concerning Patents, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/ (last modified Sept.
9, 2008).
40
See Natalie M. Derzko, Using Intellectual Property Law and Regulatory Processes to
Foster the Innovation and Diffusion of Environmental Technologies, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 3, 9-10 (1996).
41
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
42
In re United States, 877 F.2d 1568, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
43
See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1338; Air Measurement Techs., 504 F.3d at
1266.
44
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1338. See Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634,
640 (Tex. 2011) (“Congress has provided federal courts jurisdiction over civil actions
generally ‘arising under’ federal law ....“), rev‘d, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013). See gen. Isaac C.
Ta, Can Federal Courts Exercise Jurisdiction over State Law Malpractice Claims Arising
Out of Patent Law Disputes?, 3 ST. MARY‘S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 344, 354 (2013).
39
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cases arising under federal patent law.45 Specifically, 28 U.S.C § 1338(a)
gives federal district courts original jurisdiction over civil actions brought
under federal patent laws.46

STATE JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS INVOLVING PATENTS
Several courts have addressed the issue of state court jurisdiction in
cases involving patent rights.47 Cases presenting only state law claims can
still arise under federal law if the complaint raises “a significant federal
issue.”48 However, the United States Supreme Court has held that state
courts may adjudicate “patent questions” so long as the action does not “arise
under” the patent laws.49 In Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating
Corporation, the Supreme Court held that a claim may “aris[e] under” the
patent laws even where patent law did not create the cause of action,
provided that the “well-pleaded complaint establishes . . . that the plaintiff’s
right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of
federal patent law.”50 Thus, even a cause of action created by state law may
“aris[e] under” federal patent law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1338 if
it involves a patent law issue that is “(1) necessarily raised, (2) actually
45

Id. §§ 1295(a)(1), 1338(a), as amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-29, § 19(a)-(b), 125 Stat. 284, 331-32 (2011).
46
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (granting federal district courts original jurisdiction over “any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents“).
47
Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit As A Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1791, 1810 (2013).
48
Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng‘g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005).
See also T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.) (noting the
creation test articulated by Justice Holmes in American Well Works “is more useful for
inclusion than for the exclusion for which it was intended“).
49
See Dale Tile Mfg. Co. v. Hyatt, 125 U.S. 46, 52-53 (1888); Air Prods. & Chem., Inc.
v. Reichold Chems., Inc., 755 F.2d 1559, 1562, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 121, 123 (Fed. Cir.
1985); 167 A.L.R. 1114, 1118. See also A & C Eng‘g. Co. v. Atherholt, 355 Mich. 677, 95
N.W.2d 871 (1959).
50
486 U.S. 800, 808–09 (1988).
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disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court
without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.”51
Pursuant to the constitutional intellectual property clause, patent law
is entirely federal law.52 Unlike actions in patent law, legal malpractice is
governed by state law.53 Professional malpractice claims are traditionally
state law tort and breach of contract claims, predicated on an alleged error by
an attorney.54
In 2007, the Federal Circuit asserted exclusive federal jurisdiction
over patent-related malpractice claims in two decisions issued on the same
day.55 In these two malpractice decisions, Air Measurement Technologies and
Immunocept, the Federal Circuit held that disputed and substantial patent
issues in state court patent malpractice claims are subject to exclusive federal
court jurisdiction.56 Before the Supreme Court decided Gunn, the Federal

51

Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
53
Isaac C. Ta, Can Federal Courts Exercise Jurisdiction over State Law Malpractice
Claims Arising Out of Patent Law Disputes?, 3 ST. MARY‘S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 344,
354 (2013). See also Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit As A Federal Court, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1791, 1805 (2013) (stating “[t]he Federal Circuit had adopted this expansive
view despite two prominent Supreme Court cases strongly suggesting that federal
jurisdiction over a state-law claim requires a disputed question of federal law.“). See, e.g., 50
State
Survey
of
Legal
Malpractice
Law,
A.B.A.,
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/professional/malpractice_ survey.html (last
visited Apr. 7, 2013) (listing a collection of articles related to each state‘s claims and
defenses related to legal malpractice cases).
54
Joshua C. Vincent & Paul D. Swanson, It‘s Only Ethical: A Uniformity Argument for
Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction over Patent Legal Malpractice Claims, 5 LANDSLIDE 50
(2013).
55
See Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 504 F.3d
1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (patent litigation malpractice); Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright &
Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (patent prosecution malpractice).
56
See Air Measurement Techs., 504 F.3d 1262; Immunocept, 504 F.3d 1281. Joshua C.
Vincent & Paul D. Swanson, It‘s Only Ethical: A Uniformity Argument for Exclusive
Federal Jurisdiction over Patent Legal Malpractice Claims, 5 LANDSLIDE 50 (2013).
52
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Circuit had held that any state law claim that required application of patent
law was subject to federal ‘arising under’ jurisdiction.57
In Gunn v. Minton, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s
precedent and returned authority to the state courts. 58 Gunn, a patent
litigation malpractice case, presented a divisive jurisdictional issue: whether
state tort-law based professional malpractice claims stemming from federal
patent infringement litigation should be brought in state or federal courts.59
The Texas Supreme Court held the patent issue involved a substantial
element of the malpractice claim and thus was beyond the jurisdiction of state
courts.60 The Supreme Court reversed and unanimously held that state law
patent legal malpractice claims presumptively belonged in state court.61
Gunn asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Federal Circuit’s
precedent from the Federal Circuit’s 2007 decisions in Air Measurement
Technologies (patent litigation malpractice) and Immunocept (patent
prosecution malpractice).62 The Supreme Court held that a state law claim
alleging legal malpractice in the handling of a patent case did not “arise
under” federal patent law, and thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) did not deprive the
state courts of subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.63
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
ruled on a business tort claim brought by the waste-treatment business
57

Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit As A Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1791, 1805 (2013).
58
Joshua C. Vincent & Paul D. Swanson, It‘s Only Ethical: A Uniformity Argument for
Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction over Patent Legal Malpractice Claims, 5 LANDSLIDE 50
(2013).
59
Id.
60
Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).
61
Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).
62
Gunn’s facts involved patent litigation conduct, rather than patent prosecution
conduct. Id.
63
Id.
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Forrester against competitor Wheelabrator.64 Wheelabrator removed the state
law action to federal court, arguing that Forrester’s claims implicated a
substantial question of U.S. patent law.65 The central issue on appeal was
whether Forrester’s state law claims necessarily raised a “substantial
question” of federal patent law, such that the district court had original
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338 over Forrester’s claims.66 Wheelabrator
argued federal subject matter jurisdiction67 existed because Forrester could
only recover if Forrester prevailed on a “substantial question”68 of U.S.
patent law.69 Specifically, Wheelabrator argued that because Forrester
sought relief based upon allegations that Wheelabrator had made a false
statement about a U.S. patent, “such allegations necessarily required the trial
court to construe the claims of the patent in order to determine whether the
alleged statements were false”.70 Thus, Forrester’s claims raised a substantial
question of federal patent law.71
Forrester responded that federal subject matter jurisdiction did not
exist by reason of the relief he sought.72 Forrester’s claims were based upon
statements allegedly made by Wheelabrator to the Taiwanese customer
Kobin that Wheelabrator’s patents covered the process that Kobin licensed
from Forrester.73 However, Forrester argued that he did not claim patent
64

Forrester Envtl. Services, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 715 F.3d 1329
(2013).
65
Id. at 1332.
66
Id. at 1333.
67
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (granting federal district courts original jurisdiction over “any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents“).
68
See Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988)
(holding where the federal patent law does not create the cause of action, subject-matter
jurisdiction may still lie if “plaintiff‘s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a
substantial question of federal patent law.“); Gunn v. Minton, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013)
(holding federal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie where a federal issue is
necessarily raised, actually disputed, substantial, and capable of resolution in federal court
without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress).
69
Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1332.
70
Brief for Appellee at 30, Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1334.
71
Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. at 808–09.
72
Supp. Brief for Appellant at 2, Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1329.
73
Forrester Envtl. Services, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 715 F.3d 1329,
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infringement or raise any other substantial question of patent law.74 Forrester
also argued that Wheelabrator’s allegedly inaccurate statements regarding its
patent rights concerned conduct taking place entirely in Taiwan.75 Because
“Kobin’s extra-territorial practice of a method allegedly covered by
Forrester’s patents is not protected by U.S. patent law,” Forrester argued
there was no need for any fact finder to construe those Forrester patents. 76
In deciding whether Forrester’s state law claims raised a substantial
question of federal patent law, the Federal Circuit applied the Supreme
Court’s holding in Gunn.77 The Federal Circuit stated it had previously held
similar state law claims premised on allegedly false statements about patents
raised a substantial question of federal patent law, and that “[t]hose cases
may well have survived the Supreme Court’s decision in Gunn.”78 The
Federal Circuit distinguished Gunn, and held that the legal malpractice claim
did not involve a substantial question of patent law79 from two Federal
Circuit decisions that disparagement claims for false statements about U.S.
patent rights did involve substantial questions of patent law.80 The court
explained that if decided under state law, the disparagement claims “could
result in inconsistent judgments between state and federal courts,” whereas
the legal malpractice claim was “purely ‘backward looking.’”81 The Federal
Circuit expressed concern that permitting state courts to adjudicate
disparagement cases (involving alleged false statements about U.S. patent
rights) could result in inconsistent judgments between state and federal

1334 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
74
Supp. Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 2.
75
Brief for Appellee, supra note 7, at 1-2.
76
Id.
77
Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1334 (citing Gunn v. Minton, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013)).
78
Id.
79
Id. at 1334 (citing Gunn, 133 S.Ct. at 1066-67).
80
Forrester, at 1334 (citing Additive Controls & Measurement Systems, Inc. v.
Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 478 (Fed.Cir. 1993) and Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic
Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Midwest Indus.,
Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed.Cir. 1999) (en banc)).
81
Id. (quoting Gunn, 133 S.Ct. at 1066-67).
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courts.82 “For example, a federal court could conclude that certain conduct
constituted infringement of a patent while a state court addressing the same
infringement question could conclude that the accusation of infringement was
false and the patentee could be enjoined from making future public claims
about the full scope of its patent as construed in federal court.”83
The Federal Circuit concluded that the instant case did not give rise to
the possibility of future conflict.84 First, the court relied on the fact that the
allegedly inaccurate statements concerned conduct taking place entirely in
Taiwan.85 “Those statements did not concern activities that could infringe
U.S. patent rights, and it is not entirely clear why the Taiwanese entities in
this case cared about the extent of Wheelabrator’s U.S. patent rights.”86 The
court concluded, “[T]here is no prospect of a future U.S. infringement suit
arising out of Kobin’s use of WES-PHix® or FESI-BOND in Taiwan, and
accordingly no prospect of inconsistent judgments between state and federal
courts.”87
Second, the Federal Circuit reasoned there was no concrete evidence
of U.S. patent rights being implicated in the claim because the patents at
issue had all expired at the time of judgment.88 The court noted that for the
three patents that had already expired there was no prospect of future conduct
in the U.S. that could lead to an infringement suit.89 Because there was no
prospect of a future U.S. infringement suit arising out of Kobin’s conduct in
Taiwan, there was no prospect of inconsistent judgments between state and
federal courts.90 As the alleged acts occurred outside the U.S., and did not
82

Id.
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Forrester Envtl. Services, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 715 F.3d 1329,
1335 (2013).
88
Id.
89
Id. (stating “the ‘356, ‘233, and ‘114 patents have all now expired, so there is also no
prospect that future conduct in the U.S. could lead to an infringement suit regarding those
patents“). See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1338(a), 1441(a).
90
Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1335.
83
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concern activities that could infringe U.S. patent rights, the court found that,
as in Gunn, any potential federal-state conflict in the instant case was “purely
‘hypothetical.’”91
The next question was whether the doctrine of federal preemption
applied to Forrester’s claims. Wheelabrator argued resolution of the claim
construction issues would have a potential preclusive effect in future
litigation that involved the patents.92 In rejecting this argument, the Federal
Circuit court noted the Supreme Court’s rejection of a related argument in
Gunn because any such collateral estoppel effect “would be limited to the
parties and patents that had been before the state court,” and “such factbound and situation-specific effects are not sufficient to establish federal
‘arising under’ jurisdiction.”93
The court also rejected Wheelabrator’s argument that Forrester sought
remedies that might be preempted by federal law.94 The appellate court
pointed out that federal preemption is ordinarily a defense that does not
appear on the face of the complaint, and therefore did not authorize removal
to federal court.95 Therefore, the Federal Circuit concluded that
Wheelabrator’s jurisdictional arguments were without merit and even if the
allegations contained in Forrester’s complaint necessarily raised a question of
patent law, the patent law issues are not ‘substantial in the relevant sense’
under Gunn.96
Concluding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s grant
of summary judgment on Forrester’s tort law claims involving questions of
91

Forrester Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 715 F.3d 1329, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 1067 (2013)).
92
Supp. Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 2, as quoted in Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1335.
93
Id. (quoting Gunn, 133 S.Ct. at 1067–68) (internal citations omitted).
94
Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1335.
95
Id. (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95
L.Ed.2d 55 (1987)).
96
Id. at 1336 (quoting Gunn, 133 S.Ct. at 1066).
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patent law, and remanded to the district court with instructions to remand the
case to New Hampshire state court.97
V. COMMENT
THE PROBLEM WITH PATENT TROLLS
Patent trolls or NPEs are non-manufacturing patent owners (either
individuals or companies) that purchase patents and assert them with no
intention of creating or manufacturing a product using the patented
technology.98 Because NPEs do not practice the patented invention nor
produce any products, they are never infringers.99 Generally, NPEs profit by
alleging infringement and offering to license their patents to the alleged
infringer in exchange for a royalty much lower than the alleged infringer
would pay defending a claim of patent infringement.100 NPEs may threaten
97

Forrester Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 715 F.3d 1329, 1331
(Fed. Cir. 2013).
98
David G. Barker, Troll or No Troll? Policing Patent Usage with an Open Post-Grant
Review, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9, 7 (2005). See gen. Todd Klein, Ebay v.
Mercexchange and Ksr Int‘l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.: The Supreme Court Wages War Against
Patent Trolls, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 295, 314 (2007). Cf. Jaconda Wagnera,
Patent trolls and the high cost of litigation to business and start-ups – a myth? Maryland
Bar Journal, 45-OCT Md. B.J. 12 (Sept./Oct. 2012) (noting “the term ‘patent troll’ is a
pejorative applied to an entity that does not manufacture products but owns or controls
patents that it enforces against manufacturing entities to make money“).
99
See Rita Heimes, Director of Center for Law and Innovation, University of Maine
School of Law, Patent Trolls Prey On SMEs, THE RECORDER (Jul. 30, 2001) at 5, available
at
http://mainelaw.maine.edu/cli/documents/Patent_Trolls.PDF#search=‘patent%20trolls%C20
prey%CC20on%S̈MEs‘. See Terrence P. McMahon, Stephen J. Akerley & Jane H. Bu, Who
Is A Troll? Not A Simple Answer, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 159, 168 (2006).
100
David G. Barker, Troll or No Troll? Policing Patent Usage with an Open Post-Grant
Review, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9, 7 (2005). See Danielle Williams & Steven Gardner,
Basic Framework for Effective Responses to Patent Trolls, IP LINKS, Apr. 2006, at 1,
available
at
http://intellectualproperty.ncbar.org/Newsletter/Newsletters/Downloads_GetFile.aspx?id=59
56 (noting “business model[s]“ according to which a patent holder “seeks licensing fees of
$30,000-$100,000 from each of hundreds of targets“ or “fees of $200,000-$750,000 from a
smaller number of companies“).
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costly and time-consuming litigation101 against both small and large
companies.102 Because companies want to avoid litigation and the possibility
of a subsequent permanent injunction, such tactics allow NPEs to generate
large amounts of revenue through licensing.103
Unfortunately, litigation is one of the most effective mechanisms for
eliminating NPEs.104 “[A] patent owner who unsuccessfully sues an alleged
infringer may incur substantial losses if a court also holds that the patent is
invalid.”105 Given this risk, litigation allows a threatened infringer to “turn
the tables on the patentee and threaten the NPE’s own assets- possibly
driving the value of the litigation to the infringer below zero”.106 However,
101

“Even if a patent-infringement suit would be relatively strong, a litigation-wary
patent owner may deliberately pursue a business strategy according to which it seeks to
license its patent to multiple firms for significantly less than $1 million each--in other words,
for less than it would likely cost to litigate any disputes over infringement or validity.“ John
M. Golden, “Patent Trolls“ and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2161 (2007)
(noting litigation costs (including attorneys’ fees) could also be the primary drivers for
settlements). See Danielle Williams & Steven Gardner, Basic Framework for Effective
Responses to Patent Trolls, IP LINKS, Apr. 2006, at 1, 3, available at
http://intellectualproperty.ncbar.org/Newsletter/Newsletters/Downloads_
GetFile.aspx? id=5956 (noting “business model[s]“ according to which a patent holder
“seeks licensing fees of $30,000-$100,000 from each of hundreds of targets“ or “fees of
$200,000-$750,000 from a smaller number of companies“).
102
See Bessen & Meurer, supra at n. 1 (showing small and medium-sized entities made
up 90% of the companies sued, accounted for 59% of the defenses, and paid about 37% of
the aggregate costs in 2011). See also Alex S. Li, Accidentally on Target: The Mstg Effects
on Non-Practicing Entities‘ Litigation and Settlement Strategies, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
483, 523 (2013).
103
Id.
104
Williams & Gardner, supra note 99, at 1 (“Often, an effective response to a patent
troll is one that increases its uncertainty, doubt, and fear such that the patent troll concludes
that the best business decision is to end the accusation or to resolve the accusation with terms
favorable to the accused company.“).
105
See William M. Landes, An Empirical Analysis of Intellectual Property Litigation:
Some Preliminary Results, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 749, 756 (2004)
106
Compare Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy
Against Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 183, 190
(“Through litigation, a threatened infringer can turn the tables on the patentee and threaten
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smaller companies or inventors rarely have the resources required for
litigation against NPEs.107 Even after an injunction is issued, a party’s
relative size and resources may provide an advantage in negotiations.108
However, if the alleged infringer “pays royalties or quits selling the product,
the patent holder gets the benefit of a successful lawsuit without the risk of
losing the lawsuit.”109
PATENT TROLLING & ENVIRONMENTALLY-BENEFICIAL TECHNOLOGY
Intellectual property rights are a necessary incentive for investment in
development of sustainable technologies.110 Patent trolling is particularly
problematic when it affects patents that are environmentally beneficial.111 For
the patent troll‘s own assets--possibly driving the value of the litigation to the infringer
below zero.“). But cf. Rantanen at n.134 (discussing situations in which “a patentee‘s
discovery costs may equal--or exceed--those of the infringer,“ but acknowledging that such
situations would be unlikely to occur if a patentee had already successfully defended the
validity of its patent in litigation).
107
See John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls“ and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111,
2161 (2007); Leslie T. Grab, Equitable Concerns of eBay v. MercExchange: Did the
Supreme Court Successfully Balance Patent Protection Against Patent Trolls?, 8 N.C. J.L. &
TECH. 81, 113 (2006) (“For many small, independent inventors, litigation is not an option.“);
Mann, supra note 1, at 981 (“[E]ven if an early-stage company had a patent, it is unlikely that
it would have resources available to enforce the patent through litigation against a
competitor.“).
108
Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary
Injunctions, 44 J.L. & ECON. 573, 600 (2001) (concluding, based on a study of twelve cases
in which courts issued preliminary injunctions, that larger firms “hold out longer in
settlement negotiations after they have been enjoined“).
109
Douglas Laycock, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 523 (3d
ed. 2002).
110
See Janet S. Hendrickson, Is the Big Blue Marble Getting Greener?, 4.1 LANDSLIDE
No.
1,
Sept.-Oct.
2011,
at
20,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/landslide/landslide_september_20
11/behnen_land
slide_septoct_2011.authcheckdam.pdf (noting that in patenting rates for various clean energy
technologies (CETs) or green technologies, the rate of increase per year is about 20%).
111
See MaCharri R. Vorndran-Jones, Green Technology: A Way of Thinking or Stalled
at the Starting Line? 4
LANDSLIDE No. 1, Sept.-Oct. 2011, at 9,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
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example, the patents at issue in Forrester were phosphate-based treatment
systems for stabilizing heavy metals in municipal and industrial waste.112
These systems prevent heavy metals from potentially leaching into sources of
drinking water.113 Pollution prevention technologies reduce or eliminate the
environmental degradation that accompanies industrial activities.114 Patents
can protect inventors of advances in pollution control systems, as well as
other environmental technology.115
The purpose of patent law is to promote progress, “a promising
premise for the goal of incentivizing environmental innovation.”116 Some
commentators assert that intellectual property has had a neutral impact on the
environment.117 Others have argued that the patent system fails to provide
sufficient incentive for innovation in environmentally beneficial
technologies.118 In the context of environmental innovation, the benefits

landslide/landslide_september_2011/behnen_landslide_septoct_2011.authcheckdam.pdf
(“Some small business and independent inventors submit that the current U.S. patent and
legal system, with broad pioneer patents and litigious patent owners (including nonpracticing
patentees, sometimes referred to as “patent trolls“) instead present a daunting challenge to
the independent creation of new green technologies“).
112
Forrester Envtl. Services, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 715 F.3d 1329,
1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
113
Id.
114
Andrew Boynton, Eco-Patent Commons: A Donation Approach Encouraging
Innovation Within the Patent System, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y REV. 659, 662-74
(2011) (arguing industry occupies a unique position in environmental issues because of the
tension between its contribution to the harm of the environment and its role in reducing the
use of resources and pollution).
115
See Michael A. Gollin, Patent Law and the Environment/Technology Paradox, 20
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10171 (1990) (hereafter “Patent Law”).
116
Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting Environmental Innovation with Intellectual Property
Innovation: A New Basis for Patent Rewards, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 51, 54
(2005).
117
Michael A. Gollin, Using Intellectual Property to Improve Environmental Protection,
4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 193, 195-96 (1991) (hereafter “Using Intellectual Property”).
118
See Mandel, supra n. 116 at 56.
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conferred by patents may not outweigh the high cost of obtaining and
protecting them,119 nor the exclusivity problems presented by patent trolls.120
Environmental technology includes: (1) industrial processes that
minimize resource consumption and waste production, (2) consumer products
that are environmentally benign throughout their life cycles, (3) recycling
equipment and processes, (4) waste management technologies for solid and
hazardous waste, (5) pollution control devices, and (6) products and methods
for cleaning up pollution.121 Environmental technology can reduce costs of
materials, costs of production, as well as increase rates of production, and the
attractiveness of products in the marketplace.122
Many commentators contend there is potential for socially beneficial
environmental innovation that should be, but is not, occurring.123 The U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) does not discriminate against
inventions that could be seen as detrimental to society or of little worth.124
The PTO’s failure to discriminate between environmentally harmful and
beneficial technologies may have a substantively negative impact on
innovation.125 “The patent system is a measure of innovation.”126 As the total
119

See Benjamin K. Sovacool, Placing a Glove on The Invisible Hand: How Intellectual
Property Rights May Impede Innovation in Energy Research and Development (R&D), 18
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 381, 405, 436 (2008).
120
See Patent Thickets, Bad Patents, and Costly Patent Litigation, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY, (May 6, 2009, 11:56 PM), http:// volokh.com/author/guestblogger/.
121
See Gollin, Patent Law, supra n. 115.
122
See Gollin, Using Intellectual Property, supra n. 117.
123
See Mandel, supra n. 116 at 69.
124
See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366-68 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(“To be sure, since Justice Story‘s opinion in Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass.
1817), it has been stated that inventions that are ‘injurious to the well-being, good policy, or
sound morals of society’ are unpatentable... [But this principle] has not been applied broadly
in recent years.... As the Supreme Court put the point more generally, ‘Congress never
intended that the patent laws should displace the police powers of the States, meaning by that
term those powers by which the health, good order, peace and general warfare of the
community are promoted.“).
125
See Gollin, Using Intellectual Property, supra n. 117 at 235 (encouraging an
environmental perspective on patents to distinguish between harmful and beneficial
technologies, discouraging the former while encouraging the latter.) See Gray, The Paradox
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number of patent actions has increased,127 so have the number of patents filed
for renewable energy.128 Environmentally beneficial technology is a public
good.129 However, environmental innovation suffers two public good
problems - an invention public good problem and an environmental public
good problem.130 The PTO’s failure to discriminate between environmentally
beneficial and harmful technologies may represent a failure to meaningfully
prioritize socially valuable patents.131 Environmental innovation requires
large-scale capital investment, particularly in regard to green innovation.132

of Technological Development, TECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT 192 (Ausubel &
Sladovich eds. 1989) (The paradox of technology is that while technological development
can create opportunities for improving the environment, it can also disrupt and harm the
environment. By distinguishing between harmful and beneficial technology, the paradox can
be resolved.).
126
See Gollin, Using Intellectual Property, supra n. 117 at 232 fn. 182.
127
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011 Patent Litigation Study: Patent litigation trends as
the “America Invents Act“ becomes law, at 8 (2011).
128
Luı´s M. A. Bettencourt, Jessika E. Trancik, & Jasleen Kaur, Determinants of the
Pace of Global Innovation in Energy Technologies (Oct. 14, 2013), available at
http://trancik.scripts.mit.edu/home/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/plos_patents_final_submission_w_HEADER (showing a sharp
increase in rates of patenting over the last decade, particularly in renewable technologies,
despite continued low levels of R&D funding, and revealing a regular relationship between
growing markets and public R&D in driving innovative activity.).
129
Mandel, supra n. 116 at 57-58 (“Implementation of environmental innovation that
reduces pollution, improves remediation, enhances conservation, or otherwise provides
environmental benefit has substantial salutary effects for many members of society…“). See
Andrew Boynton, Eco-Patent Commons: A Donation Approach Encouraging Innovation
Within the Patent System, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y REV. 659, 662-74 (2011).
130
See Fred Bosselman et al., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 41-44
(2000) (describing the role of externalities in environmental protection and discussing the
public good aspect of environmental protection); Margaret R. Taylor et al., Regulation as the
Mother of Innovation: The Case of SO2 Control, 27 LAW AND POLICY 348 (2005) (noting
that industry tends to under-invest in “environmental technologies because of their public
good characteristic“).
131
Sarah Tran, Prioritizing Innovation, 30 WIS. INT‘L L.J. 499, 531-32 (2012).
132
See Daniel Gross, The Real “Green” Innovation, SLATE.COM (April 16, 2009, 6:57
AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2216129/.
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Patents provide little incentive to innovate if it is difficult to recover costs or
the innovation is likely to lead to costly litigation.133
FORRESTER ENCOURAGES A RESPONSE BY STATES
Patent law has traditionally been the federal government’s domain.134
However, patent trolling is a national problem, and Forrester demonstrates
that NPE-related litigation is becoming an increasing nuisance for state
officials. The practical effect of Forrester is to encourage state attorneys
general to protect businesses from abusive lawsuits filed by NPEs.
In May 2013, Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell filed a state
action against MPHJ Technology Investments in the State of Vermont
Superior Court, claiming that MPHJ had violated Vermont consumer
protection laws.135 The Vermont AG brought the claims under Section
2453(a) of the Vermont Consumer Protection Act (“VCPA”), 136 which
prohibits unfair and deceptive acts and practices in commerce. 137 Passed to
help Vermont businesses protect themselves from bad faith patent
infringement claims,138 the VCPA was the first “patent troll” legislation in
Vermont, and thus far, is the only one of its kind in the nation.139
This suit marked the first time that a state attorney general has filed
suit against a “patent troll”. The suit was filed after hundreds of Vermont
businesses140 received demand letters from various patent-holding
133

See Derzko, supra n. 40 at 8.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
135
Complaint at 3, Vermont v. MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC, No. 282-5-13
WNCV (Va. Super. Ct. May 8, 2013).
136
Vermont Consumer Protection Act, 9 V.S.A. §§4195-4199 (effective July 1, 2013)
(hereafter the “VCPA“).
137
Id. at § 2453(a).
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
The businesses included two small non-profits who were named in the complaint:
Lincoln Street, a Springfield nonprofit that gives home care to developmentally disabled
Vermonters, and ARIS Solutions, a non-profit that helps the disabled and their caregivers
with various fiscal and payroll services. Complaint at 3, Vermont v. MPHJ Technology
134
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companies.141 MPHJ Technology claims to have a patent on the process of
scanning documents and attaching them to email via a network.142 The
demand letters generally stated that using office equipment-like scanners that
send email files-violates patents owned by MPHJ Technologies.143 Usually
the letters demanded a payment of $9,000, or be faced with legal action. 144
After Vermont filed suit, MPHJ Technologies attempted to remove the action
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 to the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont,
as opposed to the State of Vermont Superior Court.145
Other states have taken an interest as well. Recently, Minnesota settled
patent litigation against MPHJ.146 The Nebraska Attorney General is also
investigating MPHJ for sending numerous demand letters claiming federal patent
violations had been perpetrated by any Nebraska consumer, small business or
nonprofit that had ever used a scanner to send files to email.147 Nebraska is the
Investments, LLC, No. 282-5-13 WNCV (Va. Super. Ct. May 8, 2013).
141
Joe Mullin, Patent troll that wants $1,000 per worker gets sued by Vermont A-G,
Ars Technica (May 22, 2013 1:40 PM CDT), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2013/05/patent-troll-that-wants-1000-per-worker-gets-sued-by-vermont-a-g/.
142
Press Release, Vermont Attorney General, Vermont Attorney General Sues “Patent
Troll“
in
Groundbreaking
Lawsuit
(May
22,
2013),
http://www.atg.state.vt.us/news/vermont-attorney-general-sues-patent-troll-ingroundbreaking-lawsuit.php.
143
Joe Mullin, Patent troll that wants $1,000 per worker gets sued by Vermont A-G, Ars
Technica (May 22, 2013 1:40 PM CDT), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/05/patenttroll-that-wants-1000-per-worker-gets-sued-by-vermont-a-g/.
144
Joe Mullin, Patent troll that wants $1,000 per worker gets sued by Vermont A-G,
Ars Technica (May 22, 2013 1:40 PM CDT), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2013/05/patent-troll-that-wants-1000-per-worker-gets-sued-by-vermont-a-g/.
145
Notice of Removal at 8, Vermont v. MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC, U.S.
District Court for the District of Vermont, Docket No. 2:13-CV-00170-wks (June 7, 2013
3:36 PM) (seeking to transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont,
as opposed to the State of Vermont Superior Court).
146
See Jennifer Bjorhus, Minnesota targets East Coast ‘patent troll‘, STAR TRIBUNE
(Aug. 27, 2013 9:20 AM), http://www.startribune.com/business/220375171.html (noting
Minnesota is the first state in the U.S. to settle with a patent troll).
147
Press Release, Attorney Gen. Jon Bruning, Patent Troll Action Won’t Deter
Nebraska
Investigation,
NEB.
DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE
(Oct.
9,
2013),
http://www.ago.ne.gov/resources/dyn/files/1108773z35296d9f/_fn/100913%25Patent
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second state whose officials are attempting to shield local businesses from
frivolous lawsuits by patent holders through state laws. In July 2013, the
Nebraska Attorney General148 initiated an investigation into whether patent
infringement enforcement efforts by a Texas law firm, Farney Daniels LLP,
violated Nebraska’s consumer protection149and unfair and deceptive trade
practices150 laws.151 The firm had sent multiple demand letters to Nebraska
businesses on behalf of patent trolls threatening lawsuits over patent
infringement.152
The Federal Circuit expressed concern over uniformity in Forrester,
fearing that permitting state courts to adjudicate claims that involved alleged
false statements about U.S. patent rights could result in inconsistent
judgments between state and federal courts.153 However, the holding in
Forrester makes it more difficult to remove a patent-related action grounded
in state law. This difficulty follows a trend set by the recently enacted
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), which overhauled the U.S.
patent laws.154 The AIA responded to concerns about patent trolls by enacting
TrollWontDeterInvestigation.pdf.
148
See Timothy B. Lee, How Vermont could save the nation from patent trolls, THE
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
1,
2013
10:05
AM),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/01/how-vermont-could-savethe-nation-from-patent-trolls/ (stating Nebraska Attorney General Jon Bruning credits
Vermont attorney general William Sorrell for drawing his attention to the problem).
149
Nebraska Consumer Protection Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 59-1601, 1602 et seq.
(Reissue 2010, Supp. 2012).
150
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-301.01 et seq.
(Reissue 2008, Supp. 2010).
151
See Press Release, Jon Bruning, Attorney General Bruning Investigating “Patent
Trolls“,
NEB.
DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE
(July
13,
2013),
http://www.ago.ne.gov/resources/dyn/files/1069520z2e735d6e/_fn/071813+Bruning+Patent
+
Troll+Release+.pd. See also Letter from Jon Bruning, Nebraska Attorney Gen., to M. Brett
Johnson,
Partner,
Farney
Daniels
LLP
(July
18,
2013),
http://www.ago.ne.gov/resources/dyn/files/1069534z3005a836/_fn/071813+Farney+
Daniels+LLP+-+Cease+%26+Desist+Letter+and+Civil+Investigative+Demand.pdf.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
David Kappos, Under Secretary of Commerce for IP and Director of the USPTO.
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a more restrictive joinder rule. This rule was intended to make it more
difficult for NPEs to file suit and to help reduce the strain on judicial
resources.155 The holding in Forrester may encourage state action against
NPEs like MPHJ, freeing up the federal courts for claims that are
substantially related to patents. Moreover, because the audience most
commonly affected by NPEs is both small and large business owners,156 the
Forrester decision provides some support for states to use their own state law
to protect their citizens from abusive lawsuits. This may stem the tide of
NPE-filed litigation, which is steadily building into a crisis.
One increasing problem is NPEs who assert weak or expired
patents.157 For example, the litigation in Forrester arose from expired
patents.158 Forrester also paves the way for states to resolve ancillary
questions of patent law while protecting small and large business owners.
The Forrester holding creates a precedent for states to bring actions against
NPEs who invoke rights to expired patents.
VI. CONCLUSION
By making it more difficult to remove a patent-related action
grounded in state law, the Forrester decision may lessen the sting of nonpracticing entity (“NPE”)-related litigation. Forrester also encourages state
attorneys general to attack patent trolls on their own ground, using state law
to protect businesses. Lastly, Forrester represents a positive first step for
states to resolve suits that involve patent claims on environmentally
beneficial technology.
Building the Innovation Revolution. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE. (Jan.
30, 2012), http://www.uspto.gov/news/speeches/2011/kappos_PCAST.jsp (most sweeping
overhaul of the patent laws in 175 years).
155
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 19(d), §299, 125 Stat.
284, 332-33 (2011).
156
See Bessen & Meurer, supra at n. 5.
157
Joel B. Cartera, Responding to a Patent Troll’s Threats, 48 ARK. LAW., Summer
2013, at 30.
158
Forrester, 715 F.3d at 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Moreover, the ′356, ′ 233, and ′114
patents have all now expired…“).
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